"We can Build You!". Some Reflections about Human Fate and Vocation by Giannini, Gianluca
Philosophy International Journal 
ISSN: 2641-9130 
 
«We can Build You»! Some Reflections about Human Fate and Vocation Philos Int J 
 
 
«We can Build You»! 
Some Reflections about Human Fate and Vocation 
  
Giannini G* 
Università di Napoli Federico II, Italy 
 
*Corresponding author: Gianluca Giannini, Università di Napoli Federico II, Via Porta di 
Massa, 1 80133 – Naples, Italy, Tel: + 39 3394210524; Email: gianning@unina.it 
 
“With the spiritual revolutions that are necessary for scientific invention, man becomes a changing species or, rather, a 
species that needs to change.” 




There is no doubt that the speed of technical and technological development during the second half of the twentieth 
century was dizzying to say the least and that many of the scientific discoveries that signalled its evolutionary 
processuality have profoundly changed and rewritten the codes we use to read and interpret the relationship between 
man and external reality. A radical change that has largely contributed and continues to contribute to eliminating, one by 
one, all those prejudices of an anthropocentric nature which, we cannot deny, have characterized the narrative of the 
human adventure. 
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We Can Build You is a science fiction novel by Philip K 
Dick: written in 1962 it remained unpublished until 
appearing in serial form as Abraham Lincoln Simulacra 
(1970). It centres on Louis Rosen, a businessman in the 
near future whose company produces spinets and 
electronic organs. Rosen’s partner wants to begin 
production of androids based on famous Civil War figures. 
The firm completes two prototypes, one of Edwin M. 
Stanton and one of Abraham Lincoln. Rosen then attempts 
to sell the robot patents to Sam K Barrows, an influential 
businessman who is opening up lunar real estate for 
purchase and colonization. Unfortunately, while the 
Stanton android proves able to adapt to contemporary US 
society, Lincoln’s simulacrum proves unable to do so, 
possibly due to the fact that the original experienced 
schizophrenia. At the same time, Louis Rosen begins a 
relationship with Pris Frauenzimmer, the schizophrenic 
daughter of his business partner, who has designed both 
androids. 
 
Pris becomes a real obsession and Louis Rosen himself 
begins to hallucinate. 
 
The remainder of the book deals with Louis Rosen’s 
admission of schizophrenia and his Jungian therapeutic 
treatment at the Kaisin Centre in Kansas, from which Pris 
was originally released. It appears that art therapy is the 
preferred treatment for people who experience 
schizophrenia, which has become increasingly common in 
this technological world. Under the influence of his 
Conceptual Paper 
Volume 2 Issue 2 
       Received Date: July 02, 2019 
    Published Date: August 01, 2019 
         Philosophy International Journal 
 
Giannini G. «We can Build You»!Some Reflections about Human Fate and Vocation. 
Philos Int J 2019, 2(2): 000121. 
    Copyright© Giannini G. 
 
2 
therapist, Rosen creates a virtual hallucinatory reality of 
his own, where he resumes his relationship with Pris, 
marries her, they have children, and grow old together, 
culminating in his ‘murder’ of her hallucinatory 
Doppelgänger, thereby curing him. 
 
The end of the science fiction novel asks whether he 
was actually ill in the first place: but this science fiction 
novel addresses important questions about human nature, 
artificial intelligence and ‘normality’. 
 
The Lincoln android is more emphatic than Pris; his 
human characters are more hard than the actual humans 
who argue over him. This is, after all, the principal 
question for Louis Rosen: this the principal object of Louis 
Rosen’s schizophrenia. 
 
Why hide it from us? We are, more or less consciously, 
terrified. 
 
As Philip K Dick suggests in We Can Build You, 
contemporary man, because of his ignorance or at least 
his extremely vague knowledge of contemporary 
scientific developments, is absolutely terrified by the idea 
of an actual manufactured being. 
 
In other words, despite his apparent experience of and 
familiarity with technology and all things technical, it is 
not really true that twentieth or even twenty-first century 
man has fully metabolized the extraordinary scientific 
progress that he has made and the opportunities it offers. 
Progress of proportions unequalled in the history of 
mankind in terms of dimensions and efficiency, let alone 
all the other things that have been achieved within only 
the past fifty or sixty years. And all this, I venture to say, 
with a tangible lack of thought. 
 
There is no doubt that the speed of technical and 
technological development during the second half of the 
twentieth century was dizzying to say the least and that 
many of the scientific discoveries that signalled its 
evolutionary processuality have profoundly changed and 
rewritten the codes we use to read and interpret the 
relationship between man and external reality. A radical 
change that has largely contributed and continues to 
contribute to eliminating, one by one, all those prejudices 
of an anthropocentric nature which, we cannot deny, have 
characterized the narrative of the human adventure. 
 
But unlike the speed at which the processuality of 
science evolves, the process of elimination is slow: hence, 
as indicated by Philip K Dick, the principle object that can 
engender schizophrenia and psychosis. What’s more, to 
this slowness, with a frequency that is anything but 
negligible, we must add that this process of dismantling 
prejudices is happening within a framework of such 
absolute poverty of reflection and self-reflection that, in 
the end, we run the risk of losing whatever ability we had 
to decode the changes that have happened, are in the 
process of happening, and are yet to come. 
 
It seems to me undeniable that, apart from the 
question of actual feasibility and the more advanced 
technical and technological typologies and modalities, by 
the standards of the main character in We Can Build You, 
Louis Rosen, average contemporary man lives, among 
other things, with the anxiety and concern, the 
bewildering astonishment at the eventuality of there 
being a creature like him, inhabiting the same 
surroundings as himself, a creature which is not the result 
of a ‘spontaneous process’ but ‘produced’ by a series of 
‘artificial’ procedures and processes. Be these the 
concrete and tangible processes of series manufacturing, 
manipulation and cloning or only the rational and 
deliberate programming of that ‘spontaneity’. 
 
The problem lies not so much in making sense of this 
anxiety, of the schizophrenic responses of average 
contemporary man, or even of revisiting Freud’s analysis 
of the disturbing, or rather the analyses of that emotion 
that destabilizes us not because of the sudden eruption of 
something strange, but through the surfacing of 
something repressed which is nevertheless familiar, 
something in the apparently un-heimlich (eerie, strange) 
which takes us back to Heimat, the heimisch (homelike, 
familiar), which is the most heimlich (innermost, private) 
thing to man’s heart. Especially when browsing through 
Freud’s essay which examines E. T. A. Hoffman’s splendid 
tale Der Sandmann (1816) – in which he tells the story of 
the young Nathaniel who, enamoured of the young and 
beautiful Olympia, discovers that the wonderful creature 
is an automaton and is so horrified that he goes mad and 
then commits suicide – there would be no shortage of 
diversionary cues1. 
 
Instead, what needs to be tested and verified as a 
priority is the complex of mechanisms of thought, the 
categorical and conceptual complex that swirls around 
fundamental theoretical questions posed and proposed, 
even from a temporal perspective not a galaxy’s distance 
from here, for example of genetics, genetic engineering, 
cybernetics and other related issues. 
 
                                                             
1Freud S (1919). 
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If it is true, as I maintain, and as Jürgen Habermas has 
rightly emphasized, that ‘most fields of practice were 
impregnated and restructured by the “logic” of the 
application of scientific technologies’2, we should maybe 
consider that, apart from the critical tenor of the 
statement, we should not be too troubled. Or at least, 
philosophers should not be too troubled: in essence, the 
principle activity of philosophy is to create and work on 
ideas, whatever the human activity that inspired them or 
was their source. 
 
An activity which, nevertheless, should not become a 
process merely of creating and crystallizing the concept 
itself, still less a self-referential contemplation of the “new 
production” of thought. But rather an activity that is 
capable of combining a constant labour of redefinition 
and honing with further self-analysis of that very 
procedure which lies at the basis of the aim, anything but 
frivolous, of constantly being open to the new that is still 
to come.  
 
To the new that has yet to be made and, at the same 
time, intimately understood by philosophy. If we do not, 
we will arrive at a place where this self-implementation of 
philosophy is halted – a procedure composed therefore of 
two phases: the foundation of a new idea and its 
progressive honing with the aim of making space for an 
understanding of the reality and of opening the way to 
new acts of thinking – where the latter would be reduced 
to nothing more than an apology for the status quo. 
 
That is to say a defence and an exaltation of the status 
quo in which contemplation, reflection, justification, or 
rather activities which are more deserving, actually 
compete but which, essentially and in most cases, respond 
to precisely those interests, including ideological interests, 
which must be protected. Activities which, in the final 
analysis, prove to be deaf and blind to the universe of 
human life in inexorable motion. 
 
So if my intention were to don the vestments of 
apologue, it would also be an apologue of the area which 
you represent and, consequently more familiar because of 
being more attended to and more intimate, that is to say a 
moral fable of decidedly more advanced contemporary 
science, I believe that, in the end, paradoxically, while 
thoughtfully discussing that ‘most intimate’ subject, we 
would find there was very little to say. Because I myself 
would have very little to say to you that would not, at best, 
do more than confirm this ‘most intimate’ to you. 
 
                                                             
2Habermas J (2001): 44. 
My work, as outlined, is varied: it tries to be that of a 
philosopher. Not simply in the literal sense of the term, of 
that which nurtures and has a love of knowledge. But of 
that which tries to work, to interpret the complex of 
human life in inexorable motion, with ideas and on ideas. 
On ideas and with ideas by means of language, well 
knowing that language itself is the home (and often the 
prison) of thought, as well as the seat in which reside not 
merely ideas, but that very workshop in which the work 
of refining and re-creating takes place, not to mention the 
analysis we were talking about. 
 
We can therefore say first of all that the specific 
modality of philosophy, which is essentially the key to 
man’s qualifying modality (at least in the West) in his 
adventure that is so distinctive from that of other living 
creatures, is that of moving through the production and 
comprehension of ideas in a progression of perpetual 
becoming. 
 
A becoming which, since it involves the problems that 
reality sends us, opens up the possibility of an exercise in 
reflection at a halfway house, an intersection at which 
things and thoughts take root. An ‘in the middle’ in which 
philosophy must necessarily also take root, because it is 
here that those epoch-making crossroads and inflections 
are produced, through which not only is it possible for 
philosophy, history, science and the arts to communicate, 
but in which the novum thought and to be thought takes 
shape. 
 
If we accept what I have said as a premise 
emphasizing the content rather than the form of method, 
it is legitimate to say that it is precisely here, starting from 
the loss of this ‘in the middle’, that we find that which I 
previously defined as ‘lack of thought’. It is here, at the 
reflective interstice which separates old horizons from 
the actual possibility of creating ex novo, that we find that 
absence and inadequacy of thought which sets in motion 
contemporary man’s schizophrenia, as well as certain 
forms of disassociation and alienation, as much from that 
very philosophy as from contemporary science itself. 
 
Having thus established these basic coordinates with 
the aim of formulating a reasoning which creates a 
genuine bridge of dialogue and effective communication, 
it is possible to begin to develop something that will form 
the theoretical nucleus of this reflection, starting from the 
assumption that Habermas has maintained in his 
introduction to a lecture in a volume which has since 
become rather famous, The Future of Human Nature: ‘in 
his novel Stiller Max Frisch has Stiller, the public 
prosecutor, ask: “What does a human being do with the 
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time he has to live? I was hardly fully aware of the 
question; it was simply an irritation!”. Frisch poses the 
question in the indicative mood. In their self-concern, 
reflective readers give the question an ethical turn: “What 
should I do with the time I have to live?”. For long enough 
philosophers believed that they could give suitable advice 
in reply. But today, in our postmetaphysical age, 
philosophy no longer pretends to have answers to 
questions regarding the personal, or even the collective, 
conduct of life’3. 
 
Precisely because we can have sympathy with 
Habermas’s acute observation, it may be legitimate to go 
further and say that, considering the fact that, 
constituently, contemporary philosophy no longer 
believes in constraining answers and not solely in relation 
to the conduct of life, the same philosophy is no longer 
disposed to accept constraints either as concerns its own 
investigation of that life or of the primary object of a 
major part of its own reflective flow: man and his 
condition. 
 
This conviction, which obviously does not cover ‘all’ of 
contemporary philosophy, in the course of reason 
nevertheless leads to many different answers of a 
speculative nature like those given by Habermas, despite 
his decision to fully embrace his initial statement defining 
and reflecting on what is and what will be the future of 
human nature. 
 
We must therefore start by accounting for the 
unravelling that philosophy is capable of performing and 
establishing with respect to ‘every bond’, i.e. with respect 
to any pretension to crystallization which, as will have 
been understood from the passage by Habermas quoted 
above, in a narrow sense has something to do with a 
certain way in which philosophy is sliding into 
metaphysics. But it also has something to do with certain 
acceptations of western humanism. Or rather, and in the 
final analysis, with those ways of thinking which, based on 
monolithic and reassuring answers, have touched on 
visions of the world that are set in stone because they are 
based on the pretension that they hold the only, and thus 
the absolutely certain and necessary, truth. 
 
It may be possible to provide a hint of how ‘the truth’, 
even as to the mere use of the word, which so often is 
apparently almost discounted, but which on the contrary 
is the mediating synthesis of our cultural baggage, can 
turn out to be misleading, precisely because it has become 
                                                             
3Habermas J (2001): 1. 
the repository for an absolute indisputability that admits 
no self-reflection. 
 
In an extraordinary novel, The Apprenticeship of Duddy 
Kravitz, the Jewish-Canadian writer Mordecai Richler has 
one of his minor characters, Benjy Kravitz, say in a 
letter/will to his nephew (Duddy himself): ‘I have note-
books of my clever sayings: don’t worry. Experience 
doesn’t teach: it deforms’4. 
 
Let us focus on the key term in this excerpt, the verb 
‘to deform’. In the common acceptation and current usage 
of ‘to deform’, in its meaning of ‘to assume a different 
shape or form’, and therefore also to ‘alter the form of 
something by stress’, there is an underlying negative 
moral judgement. Negative because it condemns any 
variation or alteration of the original shape which, by 
virtue of its originality, is ‘good’ and must not be touched. 
 
However, the possible accepted meanings of ‘to 
deform’ also include ‘to change form’, ‘to become (another 
form)’, and ‘to assume a different form’. Here an initial 
interesting fact lies not only in the decidedly more 
descriptive and value-free meaning attributable ‘to 
deform’ but also and above all because it leaves little 
margin for moral judgement, let alone for any superiority 
or goodness that may be ascribed to the originality of the 
shape that is to be deformed or has already been 
deformed. 
 
This exercise in terminological analysis, while 
introducing us to the heart of our questions, also 
recommends us to re-read and attempt to interpret 
Richler’s words more carefully. Experience deforms, 
therefore it can be read thus: the accumulation of 
subjective experiences makes it possible – albeit, as in this 
case, only at the level of memory – to change, even perfect, 
those same accumulated experiences. Not necessarily, 
however, through a distortion or degenerative corrosion 
of their original version or form. 
 
Let us therefore try to extract an initial nub of 
meaning from the questions to be tackled, by following a 
thematic trail based precisely on an analysis of the term in 
question. If we accept – and then, as we are obliged to, 
attempt to sustain and justify this option as we go along – 
that man, the human race is history, a fluid concrescence 
of historical accumulation, an unresolved summation of 
experiences in the wild¸ then they would also be those 
inscribed on the accidental path of evolution, and we 
could then say that man, the human race, is deformation. 
                                                             
4Richler M (1959): 326. 
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And that he is therefore both the object and subject of 
deformation, constantly modifying and being modified: or 
rather, as regards his own potential and ability as a 
subject coping with the eventuality of interaction (and 
therefore deconstruction and reconstruction) with the 
world around him – whether it be understood as a 
complex of beings that he encounters, or as a projective 
world, or even as that complex of beings that he himself 
has created through imagination and fulfilment. But he is 
also the subject and agent of deformation even in the 
presence of his own βίος, of which he is also the 
(theoretically conscious) object of deformation. 
 
Now, as is well-known, the lawfulness or otherwise of 
this constant and uncontrollable deforming activity, when 
placed under the scrutiny of moral judgement, is 
established in terms of macro-categories such as ‘right-
wrong’, ‘good-bad’, ‘useful-damaging’ based on an 
indicative principle of a maxim that tries to move to the 
margin of an even more general question which is 
inherent in the protective guardianship and preservation 
of man himself. That of his own permanent form. 
 
A protection, or rather derived forms of protection 
which, nevertheless, have their own roots in historical-
cultural structures based on a model of a more or less 
metaphysical foundation, the recurring motif of which, 
undeniably, is the return to a single inspirational principle. 
And from which, as we shall see, the doctrine of natural 
law is the periodically recurring condensing formula. 
 
Therefore, those that we shall see being formed as true 
and genuine models of natural law have been assembled 
in relation to certain specific ideas of human nature. Ideas 
which, discovering their sense and meaning in the 
individuation of well-established theories of natural law, 
have in fact anchored man himself to stationary programs 
and designs, or rather to forms that are immutable 
because of their metaphysical basis. 
 
As we can see, once again we have a term that is 
decidedly central to the discourse so far outlined and yet 
to come: that of form and the passing hint to the 
‘metaphysical foundation’ refers back to the device 
mentioned above relating to our shared negative 
acceptation of deformation, or rather that of ‘original’ or 
even pre-original form. 
 
But it is also easy to see that, the further we pursue 
this line of argument, the more the key problems appear 
to multiply and, in all probability, the more problematical 
the complex discourse tends to become. We should 
therefore proceed by degrees and start by clarifying and 
analysing this nullifying passage relating to natural law. 
 
As an introduction to such a fundamental question I 
believe that the words with which Edgar Morin began The 
Lost Paradigm: Human Nature, may be a good starting 
point: 
‘We all know that we are animals of the class of 
mammals, of the order of primates, of the family of 
hominids, of the genus homo, of the species sapiens, that 
our body is a machine of thirty billion cells, controlled and 
procreated by a genetic system created in the course of a 
natural evolution lasting some two to three billion years; 
that the brain with which we think, the mouth with which 
we speak, the hand with which we write, are biological 
organs. But our awareness of this ceases to operate when 
it comes to knowing that our organism is made up of a 
combination of carbon, hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen. 
Since the discoveries of Darwin, we are willing to admit 
that we are descended from primates, but not that we 
ourselves are primates. Now descended from the tropical 
genealogical tree in which our ancestors lived, we are 
convinced that we have escaped from nature for ever in 
order to build the independent kingdom of culture. Our 
destiny is obviously exceptional if we compare it with that 
of the animals – including the primates – which we have 
domesticated, modified, defeated, put in cages or nature 
reserves, whereas we have built cities of stone and steel, 
invented machines, created poems and symphonies, 
travelled in space; how can we not believe that, despite 
being a product of nature, we have become extra-natural 
or supra-natural?’5. 
 
Leaving aside the anxiety that this final question may 
provoke, let us try to identify some of the key points that 
emerge from Morin’s comments. 
 
It seems to me that one can detect in the initial 
premises of his discourse a somewhat unexpectedly 
positive answer to the final question: if we accept the 
inescapable conclusion that the start of our ‘exceptional 
destiny’ can be traced back approximately four million 
years, namely to the appearance of the first hominids, if 
not quite ten million years to the emergence of the first 
anthropoids, to then pass through the intermediate 
macro-stage of Homo Sapiens (from ten thousand to fifty 
thousand years ago), we cannot escape one fundamental 
fact: the historical anchor of our givenness, or rather the 
becoming, modifying, deforming of our givenness as a 
result of the temporality which has established us and 
continues to do so. 
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Certainly, the ‘exceptionality’ of our history, a history 
which, whether we like it or not, tells us of our close link 
with nature, could equally lead us to conclude, especially 
since the birth of modern science, that the human genus, 
while remaining in some way a ‘natural product’, has also 
raised itself from that original state and risen to a meta-
natural dimension which is at the same time a-historical, 
or rather a-temporal. 
 
It is thanks to this macro-category of ‘culture’, which is 
undeniably the historical result of our adventure ‘in the 
wild’, that we have been able to raise ourselves to the 
point of being able to liberate ourselves from that very 
historical givenness that made us and fashioned us. 
 
After all, in a more or less explicit way, certain 
twentieth-century anthropologists almost managed to 
explain it. In fact, when Arnold Gehlen pointed out that 
man’s nature is artificial, or rather that culture is a real 
and genuine ‘second nature’ which is specific to ‘human 
nature’, a structure ‘within which he alone can live’ so as 
to be ‘the product of being that is unique in the world, 
itself “unnatural”, constructed in contraposition to the 
animal’6, he was actually opening the way so that the only 
possible consideration of man is in relation to his peculiar 
capacity for supra-elevation. 
 
Based on the assumption, as plausible as it is wrong, of 
man’s natural/biological incompleteness, as highlighted 
by Roberto Marchesini in his remarkable book Post-
human, a large part of twentieth-century anthropology – 
and not only that – more or less deliberately constructed 
this schema of man’s progressive detachment from nature. 
 
In one particularly strong passage, Marchesini 
reconstructs this fundamental junction with great clarity, 
highlighting a crucial point when he says that: ‘Our 
thoughts on man’s nature and culture are largely 
constrained within an actual framework which on the one 
hand allows us to identify some of the most important 
characteristics of our species in great detail, while on the 
other it has given rise to a baseless dichotomy […]. This 
framework presents itself to man as an all-absorbing 
model of reference, which defines our speculations and 
obviously every proposition directing, correcting, or 
selecting expressions. The paradigm which has made 
possible this fracture between everything which we call 
“nature” and everything to which we attribute the title of 
“culture” is based on the simple and direct assumption 
that man, as a species, is from a biological point of view an 
incomplete being’. 
                                                             
6Gehlen A (1940): 28. 
On the contrary, it is the biological incompleteness 
itself, that ‘prerequisite for defining two large receptacles, 
sometimes synergistic, at other times antagonistic, on 
which man draws in his every expression: on the one 
hand it is nature, with its obligations and its laws, its 
instincts and tendencies, its universal if fixed character, 
while on the other it is culture as free manifestation, open 
to values, contingent to expression but transcending the 
biological being’7. 
 
Hence, in terms of culture man has transcended his 
(incomplete and deficient) biological roots to become in a 
certain sense a being that transcends himself. And 
essentially, and here it might be possible to find a small 
point if not of commonality at least of problematical 
contact, I think we can say that the work of scientific 
research and application from the second half of the 
nineteenth century onwards, does adhere in some of its 
principles, all things considered, to the antagonistic 
nature/culture device, in order to establish a moment of 
fracture imposing culture, man’s knowledge of man, as a 
springboard towards the extra-natural essence of man 
himself. 
 
By this I do not wish to give the impression that I am 
on the side of the ‘natural’: I wish only to highlight the fact 
that contemporary science, which is at the same time the 
descendant and actor of something like western 
humanism, has suffered and continues to suffer from 
certain cultural legacies which tell us, obviously, about 
some of the conceptual structures and categories which, 
undoubtedly, should support some of these irresolvable 
contradictions. 
 
To extend our dialogue further, I will try to advance 
two suspects relating to the foundation of this 
nature/culture dichotomy: contemporary science has also 
acted and interacted within a scenario of presumed 
incompleteness of the human race inheriting, more or less 
consciously, a problematic idea of our tradition, that of 
perfection, an idea with clear roots in the doctrine of 
natural law. On the basis of which it has had more 
problems than one could imagine with the notion of the 
mobility of humankind, such that for example, in more 
than a few situations, our genetic heritage has been seen 
as the standard of the actual hard nucleus of humankind 
itself which, taking account of its constitutive 
incompleteness, urges in the direction not only of further 
radicalization of the nature/culture dichotomy, but also 
towards a cognitive and application surplus of culture. 
                                                             
7Marchesini R (2002): 10. 
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This twofold suspect, moreover, is based on another 
undeniable fact: that we must not to lose sight of a crucial 
factor which describes the epistemological statute of 
technique and technology, and thus of science itself. As 
Heidegger understood, this epistemological statute has its 
roots in the predisposition ‘to prepare and procure a view 
of processes that can be commonly controlled. The 
limitless power that is required for such a task, if on the 
one hand it determines that which is peculiar to modern 
technology, and on the other avoids any attempt to 
reproduce it by technical means. The technical character 
of science, which imprints itself ever more univocally, can 
easily be recognized from the (instrumental) way in 
which it conceives those categories which from time to 
time define and articulate their subject area. […] Their 
truth is measured by the effect produced by their use 
within the research process. Scientific truth becomes 
equated with the efficiency of these effects’8. 
 
Here the point being touched on is diriment and refers 
to the metaphysical pretension mentioned earlier, that of 
the pretension to reduce being, the ontological level, to 
that of entity in order to ontologize the entity, a mistake 
which, among others, can be found in every 
anthropocentric pretension of which, it is useless to deny, 
science has to some extent been the vehicle. 
 
Nevertheless, if we accept Heidegger’s notion from a 
purely descriptive and non-valutational point of view, we 
ought to go a step further. That is, having put forward 
these two suspects, that it seems to me that genetics, 
genetic engineering and cybernetics, at least in their 
conceptually more conscious articulations, have 
simultaneously managed not only to overcome this 
dichotomy, but have also provided and continue to 
provide the concrete possibility of a genuine recasting of 
humanism from the rethinking of humankind that they 
started. 
Apart from the effects themselves as a measurable 
situation of tangible efficiency, genetics, genetic 
engineering and cybernetics have imprinted and continue 
to imprint a very clear marker relating to a new and 
authentic way of reading what mankind’s vocation is. 
More precisely, in respect of what has been and is man’s 
destiny, in the exact sense of the – truly epoch-making – 
possibility of discovering his actual condition. A discovery 
detached from metaphysics: this is our historical situation 
with the provision that – as Heidegger once again teaches 
us – ‘every scientist’ is ‘able to turn, pondering’ with an 
‘alert spirit’, in the full knowledge that he runs the risk of 
                                                             
8Heidegger M (1965): 46. 
‘allowing himself to get involved in conversation with 
philosophy’9. 
 
The most obvious key to this historical situation lies in 
the work begun by genetics, genetic engineering and 
certain aspects of cybernetics on the two fundamental 
elements which make man what he is and create the 
temporality that we are: life and death. 
 
If we are prepared to assume that man is not in any 
way deficient from a biological point of view and that, 
furthermore, ‘it is not true that man makes himself 
complete through culture, but that it is far more plausible 
to think that man perceives himself as incomplete as the 
result of culture’ 10 , then we can say, completing 
Marchesini’s position, that it is really genetics, genetic 
engineering and even cybernetics which render a new 
and different acceptance of the cultural process possible 
as a ‘“hybrid event”, that is in terms of an “externalization” 
realized through [...] the use of an instrument, the 
partnership with another species, the conferral of 
meaning, the proposition of a theory – in short anything 
that creates a link with external reality’11. 
 
And it is therefore precisely this ‘hybrid event’ which, 
having assumed that processuality which is historically 
determined, shapes and tells us about the human race and 
its specificity. It is in the explaining of hybridization that 
culture lies, the reason why there is no longer a 
dichotomy with nature. Or rather that as a result of its 
original incompleteness culture can no longer assume the 
mere completion of nature or, in some respects, act as the 
‘engine of nature’ because of its capacity to retroact on the 
man-system itself. As Heinrich Popitz well understood, 
‘technological action develops from a specific 
technological characteristic of man, from a specific ability 
inherent in his organism. Technology does not 
compensate for an organic insufficiency but on the 
contrary exploits an organic capacity’12.  
 
Therefore, and in other terms, technological 
application, technological objects have, on the one hand, 
increased the supremacy of man’s intervention, while on 
the other they have contributed to transforming his own 
competencies, demanding from him new skills and 
abilities. 
 
In the end, technology and technique do not complete 
man, in fact they do no more than extend his field of 
                                                             
9Heidegger M (1965): 44. 
10Marchesini R (2002): 24. 
11Marchesini R (2002): 25. 
12Popitz H (1995): 42. 
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action and deformation. Again: technique and technology 
do not rescue an original deficient form and extend it in 
the direction of completeness and therefore of perfection; 
they ‘only’ render accessible new ways of co-existing with 
the internal and external without a precise metaphysical 
finalism. 
 
Nevertheless, to be able to fully understand this 
extraordinarily important novum of which genetics, 
genetic engineering and cybernetics are the vehicles, or 
more precisely, to be able to grasp the whole range of 
possibilities that modern science unfolds on the way to 
developing a neo-humanism based on a more authentic 
notion of mobility (deformation) of humankind, it is 
necessary to clear the decks of a few prejudices. These are 
the cultural prejudices which in fact lay behind the two 
reservations mentioned a little earlier. 
 
However, I would first like to say that Morin’s 
troublesome question from which we started is simply a 
question that has been badly put, because it is a question 
that arises from an initial and fundamental prejudice 
relating to nature itself and to its statute of fixity. 
 
The problem is that nature, natures, the idea of nature 
or, more precisely, ideas of nature are in their turn an 
historically defined fact. The question posed by Morin in 
relation to our extra- or meta-naturalness, is a question 
that starts from an historical and fixed idea or rather 
ideas of man and nature, in the sense of ideas of man and 
nature that are historically fixable. 
 
My invitation, and therefore my progress further into 
the construction of this reasoning, consists of an attempt 
to deconstruct it by finding at the end a key term for the 
proposition of a neo-humanism: mobility. Or rather the 
term from which I will then try to demonstrate in a 
definite and definitive manner how the nature/culture 
contraposition is not only the vehicle of historical ideas – 
and therefore traceable and explainable – about man and 
nature, but also that the appeal which is addressed to us, 
based on the historicity-mobility of human beings, 
reaches into the heart of that ‘epoch-making’ rethinking of 
these same categories. 
 
A rethinking, therefore, which implies a chiastic 
dialectic of nature and culture through the acceptance of 
the possibilities offered and yet to be offered by genetics, 
genetic engineering and cybernetics. From here, from the 
frontier or even limit of this possibility, I will try to 
further delimit the concept previously introduced of 
hybridization and, finally, to advance an alternative 
concept of man as an open system, that is deformed. 
In other words, we need to deconstruct further before 
we can rebuild on new foundations, foundations which 
are bound to be disenchanted in one sense or another: as 
much in the sense of nature as of man himself and hence 
in the sense of culture. 
 
The main object of this deconstructive intention, as 
already announced several times, concerns the earlier 
speculative junction of these ‘three senses’, namely 
natural law and its formulations and prejudicial and 
prejudicing definitions. Obviously, the method of this 
deconstruction cannot but be historical-situational. 
 
Let us begin by trying to provide and elucidate a 
definition of this central question, or rather to delimit as 
far as possible the range of this deconstructive intention-
action. 
 
In a highly relevant text from modern 
history/philosophy, The Philosophy of Enlightenment by 
Ernst Cassirer, there is a section dedicated to Law, State 
and Society, a section which contains elements worth 
investigating in our quest to discover hotlines to 
unravelling the questions which I have attempted to raise 
so far. 
 
Skimming over the attack in the first of the two 
paragraphs of this section, The idea of right and the 
principle of inalienable rights, we find: ‘a fundamental 
feature of the philosophy of the Enlightenment appears in 
the fact that, despite its passionate desire for progress, 
despite its endeavors to break the old tables of the law 
and to arrive at a new outlook on life, it returns again and 
again to the persistent problems of philosophy’13. 
 
We must therefore ask ourselves what there is in the 
case in point, that is the case of the ‘intellectual 
construction of everything new in existence’, which tells 
us about our current situation in a way that is still 
relevant, about one of humanity’s most ancient 
philosophical problems. 
 
E. Cassirer himself tells us immediately, when he 
writes: It is ‘the problem of law’14. But in what sense does 
it then ‘become’ an ‘Enlightenment problem’? In the sense 
that ‘the thinkers of this era are never satisfied with the 
consideration of conventional historical law; they go back 
rather to “the laws we were born with”’15. 
 
                                                             
13Cassirer E (1932): 234. 
14Cassirer E (1932): 235. 
15Cassirer E (1932): 235. 
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To be clearer still: it is a question of natural law. 
 
So the first step to take, as we have said, is to go and 
find a definition of natural law. This passage – not the 
easiest – is, in certain respects, even a preliminary one, 
also and above all because few concepts are as 
ambiguously polysemous as that of the doctrine of natural 
law and hence of natural law itself. This variety and 
multiplicity is the conceptual and historical testimony of 
the plurality of positions assumed by the ‘idea of natural 
law’ in various moral situations, which only if known 
historically in their specific individuality can lead to 
cognitions that are neither vague nor approximate. 
 
Indeed, this idea has for centuries been burdened with 
closely and subtly contrasting meanings, in an effort to 
distinguish itself in ramifications that cannot be ascribed 
to doubt and original colourless unity; however, its 
passage through various epochs has endowed it with a 
unitary aspect, thereby legitimizing, through this 
appearance of unity, its current use as a common 
denomination, with unitary significance. 
 
Let us take for example a definition of the doctrine of 
natural law, apparently quite generic on its own, or rather 
that of the legal-philosophical doctrine that distinguishes 
– in the sense of recognizing, therefore recognizes – a 
valid law of nature, intrinsic to human reason, preceding a 
positive law willed by men. 
 
In other words, the doctrine of natural law is the 
doctrine according to which there exists a ‘natural law’ 
(ius naturale) that can be known, or rather a system of 
norms of inter-subjective conduct that is different from 
that which makes up the norms of the State. This type of 
law, to try to be more explicit, has value in itself, it is 
earlier than and superior to positive law and, when 
contrasted with the latter, should even prevail over it. 
 
The doctrine of natural law, therefore, is antithetical to 
that ‘legal positivism’ according to which law is only that 
which is imposed by the State, and the validity of which is 
independent of any reference to ethical values. Sometimes, 
or rather very often, in confirmation also of the lack of 
thought and of the ‘dilettantism’ which inhabits so much 
of modern debate on matters of law, philosophical law, 
bioethics and therefore of politics, the term ‘natural law’ 
is reserved for doctrines that share few of the specific 
characteristics which supported these theories in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. So much so that 
they have given rise to the mistaken opinion that the 
doctrine of natural law actually has its origins in that 
period of history. 
The ‘doctrine of natural law’ is therefore a 
dangerously equivocal expression, since its meaning, both 
philosophical and political, can be presented in very 
different ways according to the various conceptions of 
natural law. 
 
And indeed, with respect to those various conceptions 
of natural law, it is plausible to say that at least three 
fundamental versions of this have emerged in the history 
of philosophy: that of a law established through the 
decision of a divine will, which was revealed to mankind; 
that of a ‘natural’ law in the strict sense of being 
physically innate – like a sort of instinct – to all animate 
beings; and finally, that of a law dictated by reason and 
therefore specific to man, who discovers it autonomously 
within him. 
 
These three versions are substantially heterogeneous 
concepts, and in some respects even conflict with one 
another: however, all three different versions have in 
common the idea of a system of norms which logically 
predate and are ethically superior to those of the State, to 
whose power they constitute an impassable barrier. Legal 
norms, in other words, but also the political activity of 
States, of institutions and individuals which conflict with 
natural law, however it is conceived, are considered as 
damaging to natural law itself. 
 
I spoke, however, of the existence of various 
conceptions of natural law. At this point, in order to better 
understand the articulation of these three versions, we 
need to revisit some of the moments in the history of this 
‘idea’, to see what is ‘inherited’ and ‘transmitted’, what is 
‘remodelled’, and what is ‘developed’, in essence, of this 
most ancient of questions which has accompanied us to 
the threshold of this epoch-making turning-point. 
 
We can start by saying that the first manifestations of 
the doctrine of natural law can be found in Ancient Greece. 
‘Traces of natural law’ are present in Plato (mostly in the 
political dialogues), fundamentally because his idealism, 
in which we see the tension of phenomena versus ideas as 
the universal aspiration to a perfection of every being for 
that essential purpose which is his and which is concealed 
in the reasons of his ideality, can be considered finalistic. 
In the theory of Goodness, Goodness is always presented 
as an absolute end in which the whole world of ideas 
should be summed up in its conclusive oneness. If the idea 
of a natural law is incidentally present also in Aristotle, 
who speaks of an ‘alliance between the physical and 
metaphysical’, it is in the Stoics that we find it 
substantially developed. For the Stoics, nature is governed 
by an immanent rational universal law, and man must 
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‘aspire to live in accordance with nature’, including with 
regard to legal relationships. 
 
We know of this Stoic doctrine above all from its 
‘popularization’ by Cicero in works that had a major 
influence on early Christian thinking, in the Middle Ages 
and even on the first modern doctrines of natural law. In a 
famous passage of De republica, Cicero defended the 
existence of a ‘true’ law, conforming to reason, immutable 
and eternal, which does not vary according to country or 
time, and which man cannot violate without disavowing 
his own human nature. 
 
Reported and collected by one of the Fathers of the 
Church, Lattanzio, this Ciceronian prescription had a great 
influence on Christian thought in Latin culture, which 
based it on the idea of a natural law dictated by reason. 
However, this gave rise to serious theological problems 
within Patristics itself, either from the difficulty of 
explaining the coexistence of a natural law and a revealed 
law, or because the admission of the presence within man 
of an autonomous moral law brought into question the 
necessity for Grace. 
 
Roman lawyers also drew upon Stoicism for their idea 
of a natural law, although without taking it any further: 
one of the greatest, Ulpiano, even managed to distort it 
profoundly, defining ‘natural law as that which nature has 
taught all animate beings’, among whom he explicitly 
included the animals. We can easily understand why this 
implied the reduction of natural law from a ‘norm of 
conduct’ to ‘pure instinct’, and to a real necessity for 
physical order. 
 
Ulpiano’s conception of natural law is nevertheless 
very important, because at the level of Cicero’s idea – 
antithetical, as we have seen – it was often embraced by 
medieval writers. In fact it is a characteristic of almost all 
medieval thought to accept the doctrine of natural law in 
all its modulations, without an awareness of the 
irreconcilability between them. Next to Ulpiano’s 
naturalistic version, and Cicero’s rationalistic one, 
medieval thinkers were able to develop the doctrine of a 
natural law identified with the law revealed by God to 
Moses and with the Gospel. 
 
This confusion and tangle of versions finally came to 
an end with Saint Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth 
century. With the Aquinate, natural law becomes that part 
of the order placed by the reason of God the ruler of the 
universe which is present in the reason of man: a law, and 
therefore rational. In some respects, the doctrine of 
natural law has finally managed to become wholly itself: it 
is the law of the whole of nature, inevitably total by divine 
decision: to avoid it is to avoid the order of nature which 
rules both heaven and earth. 
 
Perhaps we can synthesize Thomas’s position with 
this ‘formula’: union and at the same time distinction of 
lex aeterna, lex naturalis and lex humana. The doctrine of 
natural law in Aquinas is truly itself because it is not 
limited to being a politico-legal criterion but, anticipating 
the marriage of physics and metaphysics in the wake of 
Aristotle, presents itself as the manifestation of the 
natural reason that rules the universe. One law by which 
all natures – especially that of man, the summit of 
creation – must abide if they are to reach that bonum 
universi – the end which the whole of reality is 
approaching. Aquinas’s naturalistic finalism is therefore 
at the same time a cosmology, a model of ethics and a 
theorization of an ideal arrangement of a moral world. 
 
However, in the climate of the theology of the late 
Middle Ages, Aquinas’s doctrine of natural law conflicted 
sharply with current voluntaristic trends, the major 
exponent of which was undoubtedly William of Ockham 
(fourteenth century). But the idea I particularly wanted to 
highlight in Aquinas’s doctrine of natural law, and the one 
most often asserted, is the principle according to which a 
positive law deformed by natural law, and therefore 
unjust, is not a true law and, as a result, does not have to 
be obeyed. 
 
In reality, the Thomistic doctrine of natural law did no 
more than restate, even if it surrounded it in a theological 
framework, that Stoic-Ciceronian view of true law as 
something rational. And although a highly diffuse 
common historiographical passage may maintain the 
contrary, today there is a growing opinion that the 
modern doctrine of natural law – which particularly 
during the eighteenth century assumed decidedly secular 
characteristics, as well as decidedly liberal ones in the 
political sphere – has in its turn developed largely on the 
basis of the Stoic-Ciceronian doctrine, which has been 
handed down thanks to the ‘Aristotelian’ reception 
achieved by St Thomas Aquinas. 
 
However, within the dispute between voluntarism and 
the Thomist doctrine of natural law, the theologians and 
jurists of the sixteenth century generally made an attempt 
at mediation. In this context we can find a place for the 
Dutch writer Hugo Grotius, who is normally 
acknowledged as the father of the modern doctrine of 
natural law. 
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In his work De jure belli ac pacis (1625), while placing 
natural law on the basis of an identifiable law, Grotius 
affirmed that this natural law is dictated by reason and 
that it is independent not only of God’s will, but even of 
His own existence. 
 
If we look at Cassirer’s text again, we find this 
transition effectively underlined: ‘as we find [...] in the 
prolegomena of [Grotius’s] work On the Law of War and 
Peace, the Platonism of modern natural law is most 
perfectly expressed’16. And again: ‘in enacting his various 
positive laws the legislator follows an absolutely 
universally valid norm which is exemplary and binding 
for his own as well as for every other will. It was in this 
sense that Grotius made his famous statement that the 
propositions of natural law would retain their validity 
even if one were to assume that there was no God or that 
the Deity was not concerned with human things. This 
statement is not intended to open up a chasm between 
religion on the one hand and law and morality on the 
other. [...] The assertion that there can and must be a law 
even without the assumption of divine existence, is 
therefore not be understood as a thesis but as a 
hypothesis’17. Ultimately, it means bringing into the field 
of law those things that had been acquired by modern 
science: it means finding a source of legal knowledge 
which does not flow from divine revelation, but which is 
established in itself, in its ‘own nature’, in fact. Just as 
Galileo asserted and fought for the autonomy of physical-
mathematical knowledge, so Grotius stood up for the self-
determination of knowledge of law. 
 
Therefore, and just to make explicit the centre of 
nascent modern natural law, for Grotius the law does not 
exist because God exists: ‘it springs from the pure idea of 
the good, from the idea which Plato had said surpasses 
everything in force and age’18. 
 
This statement by Grotius, in the Age of Enlightenment, 
appeared revolutionary and a precursor of the new 
secular and anti-theological culture, to which Grotius’s 
doctrine of natural law would therefore open the way in 
the field of morals, law and politics. And indeed we can 
also add that in that sense he acted historically. Grotius’s 
work, created in the seventeenth century, as a systematic 
treatise on supra-natural law, and the fame it attracted all 
over Europe, had the merit of disseminating the idea of a 
‘natural law’ in the sense of a ‘non supernatural’ law, a law 
whose source of validity lay exclusively in its conformity 
                                                             
16Cassirer E (1932): 240. 
17Cassirer E (1932): 240. 
18Cassirer E (1932): 241. 
with human reason. This conception of natural law, 
without a doubt, contributed fundamentally in spreading 
the idea of the necessity for positive law and for the 
political constitution of the States to conform to such a 
law. 
 
Before proceeding any further, it is worth repeating a 
summary of the salient passage: essentially, there is no 
fracture between ancient, medieval and modern doctrines 
of natural law, on the contrary, there is a traceable sign of 
substantial continuity. As emphasized by one of the great 
scholars of these problems, Pietro Piovani: ‘having 
perfected itself in the medieval order, the doctrine of 
natural law is being corrupted in the modern “disorder”. 
The effort of creating a single order realized in the Middle 
Ages with the aid of impulses originating in Hellenic and 
Hellenistic culture is giving way to an effort towards an 
ordinatio ad plura.’19 As the sought-after unity of the 
medieval universe has disintegrated, the modern age has 
certainly pursued the universalistic trajectory of natural 
law, but in the sense of completing the parabola. In this, 
therefore, lies the mark of continuity. 
 
The modern doctrine of natural law has placed the 
accent strongly on the subjective aspect of natural law, on 
its so-called innate rights. It is precisely because of that 
very characteristic that it has had such a profound effect 
on political doctrines of an individualistic and liberal 
tendency, imposing the demand for respect on the part of 
political authority for what are proclaimed as the ‘innate 
rights of the individual’. 
 
The State itself is considered by the modern doctrine 
of natural law to be a voluntary action by individuals 
rather than, as in most classical and medieval doctrines, 
an institution which is by nature necessary. For modern 
jurists of natural law, individuals are abandoning the 
‘natural state’ and putting their faith in the politically 
organized State, endowed with its own authority in order 
that their natural rights may be better protected and 
guaranteed; and the State is legitimate by virtue of and 
until it fulfils its essential function, which has been 
delegated to it through a contract, namely a pact between 
citizens and sovereign. In some of these modern doctrines 
of natural law, individualism is even pushed to the point 
of regarding this contract between individuals to be 
society itself, and of defining the social contract in two 
expressions: a pact of union and a pact of subjection. But 
this is much rarer than we might think, because even 
among modern jurists of natural law the ‘natural state’ 
has been generally represented as a form of society: a 
                                                             
19Piovani P (1961): 77. 
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society which is nevertheless precarious and uncertain, 
meaning that it is not only appropriate but necessary to 
find a way out of this condition and create an organized 
politico-legal institution. 
 
This was the case of Hobbes, for example, who, in 
order to overcome the ‘natural state’ in which one man 
preys on the other, was forced to invent a State that was 
so powerful that it commanded as much fear as possible. 
 
Here I would like attempt to extract a few points of 
connection: innate rights, natural state and social contract, 
although interpreted differently by various authors, are 
characteristic concepts of the modern doctrine of natural 
law. They are to be found in all doctrines of natural law of 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, so much so that 
it was possible to speak of a ‘school of natural law’, albeit 
somewhat inappropriately. 
 
Inappropriately, because the theories of the various 
sixteenth and seventeenth century natural philosophers, 
among whom we count not only Grotius, Hobbes and 
Locke, but also Milton, Pufendorf, Thomasius, Wolff, 
Vattel and in a very particular position Rousseau, Kant 
and, during the early phases of his thinking, Fichte, 
present us with differences that are sometimes extremely 
profound. 
 
Amongst this fissure of differentiations we must surely 
consider the case of Rousseau: in his second work, 
Discourse on the Origin and Basis of Inequality Among Men 
(1755), Rousseau was already trying to reconstruct the 
history of humanity from a hypothetical ‘natural state’. 
Not a state, however, conceived in the manner of natural 
philosophers, as the natural social basis from which the 
State will rise, but rather as a primitive and brutal 
condition in which animal-man has yet to distinguish 
himself from other animals and knows no form of 
sociality. According to the reconstruction provided by 
Rousseau, natural catastrophes gave rise to the formation 
of the first social groups, on the basis of which would 
develop that which is unique to the human race: language, 
passions, technology, arts, work. Only at this point did the 
idea of inequality begin to establish itself, and not on the 
basis of original and natural differences, but on the basis 
of causal events which had allowed some to secure what 
goods there were, while obliging others to sell their own 
work to survive. 
 
The doctrine of natural law of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, and I believe that this is the crucial 
fact to bear in mind, committed a grave error of historical 
interpretation: not only by advancing these as events that 
had actually happened as well as being required by 
reason, but also by conceiving as claims and necessities of 
reason those very things which in reality were political 
and economic demands of the society of the time, in 
essence imposing that same reason as a unifying code of 
reality and, therefore, as a metaphysical claim that 
everything can be harmonized. A claim which, all things 
considered, again presupposes the classical form of 
humanism with which we still interact today. 
 
A first deconstructive observation comes to us from 
Marchesini, on the very subject of ‘harmony’ as a 
distinctive mark of the totalistic metaphysics of the 
theories of natural law, when he states that: ‘order and 
harmony reveal the deep need to clamp down on 
becoming, namely to identify ontological limits […] 
capable of sustaining the system in a state of apparent 
motility. The logical consequence of this interpretation is 
the tendency to consider change as something opposed to 
the natural order of things and therefore to be considered 
as some kind of dangerous mutation. […] Harmony, as the 
finalistic and organized arrangement of relationships […] 
is a characteristic which […] closes the system and in a 
certain sense is enclosed in itself. Harmony is autarchical 
organization […]. It is given by […] and is indicative of 
beauty and justice. Order and harmony rest on the idea of 
measure, or rather of particular entities which rule the 
nomos of the cosmos in an inflexible and static manner.’20 
 
We could also add that a highly significant guilt was 
added to these metaphysical cathedrals, and with extreme 
theoretical efficiency, by Ortega Y Gasset when he stated 
that ‘nature is a thing, a great thing, that is composed of 
many lesser things. Now, whatever be the difference 
between things, they all have one basic feature in 
common, which consists simply in the fact that things are, 
they have their being. And this signifies not only that they 
exist, that there they are, in front of us, but also that they 
possess a given, fixed structure or consistency. [...] Today 
we know that all the marvels of the natural sciences, 
inexhaustible though they be in principle, must always 
come to a full stop before the strange reality of human life. 
Why? If all things have given up a large part of their secret 
to physical science, why does this alone hold out so 
stoutly? The explanation must go deep, down to the roots. 
Perchance it is no less than this: that man is not a thing, 
that it is false to talk of human nature, that man has no 
nature [...]. Human life [...] is not a thing, has not nature 
[...]. Man [...] has no nature; what he has is ... history.’21 
 
                                                             
20Marchesini R (2002): 200, 201. 
21Ortega Y Gasset in Cassirer E (1944): 218. 
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But if things really are as Ortega says, why linger so 
much over apparently minor aspects of ‘questions of 
natural law’? 
 
This major part dedicated to the doctrine of natural 
law, extended to the point of involving issues such as 
those of the State, the law, the social contract, in fact 
militates against an understanding of the full import of 
the epochality of the historical situation in which we find 
ourselves living. 
 
If the speculative capacity of our traditional humanism 
is at stake, as it is at stake, that means that what is in 
question, the object of the question, is the structure, the 
entire conceptual scaffolding of this humanism and, 
consequently, of everything which has depended on it and 
still depends on it today. 
 
Let us try to understand and assess this junction a 
little better: the ideas and visions of natural law gave rise 
not only to certain interpretations and acceptations of 
human nature, but over the centuries we have also used 
them as the basis on which we have produced and erected 
our superstructures. Elaborations and concepts such as 
those of State, society, religion, law and even science have 
been moulded and modelled, including in the way in 
which they interrelate – an interrelation which defines 
our identity – from these visions or rather from these 
metaphysical and totalistic acceptations that have a 
strongly anthropocentric background. 
 
Visions and acceptations of a realm of order, of reason 
and spirituality or of both, a realm based, in its various 
forms, on a definition of man as the bearer of a 
supremacist autonomy and separateness which, owing to 
ontological tendencies towards steady decay existing 
within the being (man), have guaranteed, in terms of an 
original purity and perfection (that of being) to which it 
finally conforms, not only a kind of existential 
independence, but also the possibility of building and 
maintaining a unique and systematic whole. And it is here 
that the meta-naturalistic, meta-physical pretension of 
traditional humanism lies and has lain. 
 
This is not a value judgement that is in question here, 
merely a descriptive profile. The problem is not to judge 
whether it has been a good or an ill: at this stage of the 
analysis that would not make much sense. We must limit 
ourselves to recording a development which, despite 
everything, despite its irresolvable internal contradictions, 
has opened the way to our current epochality with its 
definitive short-circuit. Although, and it is nullifying to 
even specify this point, from a perspective that is anything 
but attributable and ascribable to the philosophy of 
history. Hence without this development being 
compressible in any forced chain or historical 
processuality. 
 
Changing, thus, the idea, the vision of man in the sense 
that we shall shortly reveal, that not only is traditional 
humanism in crisis, but also everything that has been and 
is unrelated to it. This, we can say, is the meaning of that 
crossroads, that epochal junction (because historical and 
determined historically) in which genetics, genetic 
engineering and cybernetics have pursued and continue 
to pursue a project of decisive fracture. 
 
If the aim is the delineation of a neo-humanism which 
tries to base itself on new acquisitions of these points 
advanced by contemporary science, then all our 
superstructures are affected. This is epochality and it 
obliges us to think and to act less as a consequence, or 
even in consequence, that is in a situation, or rather in the 
preliminary awareness that, beyond traumas or 
schizophrenic responses, we cannot go back and embrace 
lost horizons. Horizons which, on account of their unitary 
and cohesive nature, have surely engendered safety and 
certainties. 
 
But the epochality of our historical period is the 
abandonment of any kind of metaphysical safety, of a 
totalism in which every tiny fact necessarily has its place 
and order. The aim of metaphysics as counter-evidence of 
the projective self-referentiality of mankind is to collapse 
the edifice of self-absolving and self-fulfilling guarantees 
and certainties, such as those that consider culture to be 
‘second nature’. 
 
We therefore need to define some new coordinates, 
based on the old ones, in the knowledge that this novum – 
and not just potentially – will in itself be of interest to 
every area of humanity. 
 
Provocatively, I would like to hazard a perhaps more 
stimulating hypothesis to lighten the discourse, and that 
is that the literary genre of science fiction, among its more 
dedicated authors, has cultivated some fundamental 
features towards a delimitation and definition of this 
novum. And it has done so not so much and not only 
through its visionary capacity to envisage prophetic 
scenarios, but rather because of its own constitutive 
charter which, precisely because ‘the true protagonist of a 
Science Fiction story or novel is an idea and not a person’ 
and ‘if it is good Science Fiction the idea is new, it is 
stimulating, and, probably most important of all’ it sets off 
‘a chain reaction of ramification ideas in the mind of the 
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readers22, it is able to reveal ‘a new need for contiguity 
and experimentation of being based on the most 
advanced acquisitions of science’23. 
 
We can see, in a special way, what Philip K. Dick – the 
author we started out with – wished to convey in his own 
science fiction stories. 
 
‘I have, in some of my stories and novels, written 
about androids or robots or simulacra – the name doesn’t 
matter; what is meant is artificial constructs 
masquerading as humans. Usually with a sinister purpose 
in mind. I suppose I took it for granted that if such a 
construct, a robot, for example, had a benign or anyhow 
decent purpose in mind, it would not need to so disguise 
itself. Now, to me, that then seems obsolete. The 
constructs do not mimic humans; they are, in many deep 
ways, actually human already. They are not trying to fool 
us, for a purpose of any sort; they merely follow lines we 
follow, in order that they, too, may overcome such 
common problems as the breakdown of vital parts, loss of 
power source, attack by such foes as storms, short-
circuits – and I’m sure any one of us here can testify that a 
short-circuit, especially in our power supply, can ruin our 
entire day and make us utterly unable to get to our daily 
job, or, once at the office, useless as far as doing the work 
set forth on our desk’24. 
 
But what then is the question, the central idea 
supporting this type of framework? 
 
‘I would like, then, to ask this: what is it, in our 
behaviour, that we can call specifically human? That is 
special to us as a living species? And what is it that, at 
least up to now, we can consign as merely machine 
behaviour, or, by extension, insect behaviour, or reflex 
behaviour?’25 
 
And, most likely, the outline of the response prepared 
by Dick will supply some interesting elements to be 
developed. 
 
First of all, ‘by “android” I do not mean a sincere 
attempt to create in the laboratory a human being [...]. I 
mean a thing somehow generated to deceive us in a cruel 
way, to cause us to think it to be one of ourselves. Made in 
laboratory – that aspect is not meaningful to me; the 
entire universe is one vast laboratory, and out of it come 
sly and cruel entities that smile as they reach out to shake 
                                                             
22Dick PK (1981): 100. 
23Marchesini R (2002): 139. 
24Dick PK (1972): 129. 
25Dick PK (1972): 130. 
hands. But their handshake is the grip of death, and their 
smile has the coldness of the grave’26. 
 
And: ‘a human being without the proper empathy or 
feelings is the same as an android built so as to lack it, 
either by design or mistake. We mean, basically, someone 
who does not care about the fate that his fellow living 
creatures fall victim to; he stands detached, a spectator, 
acting out by his indifference John Donne’s theorem that 
“No man is an island”, but giving the theorem a twist: that 
which is a mental and moral island is not a man’27. 
 
Now, apart from the science fiction (?) intrusion of the 
android, of the human-android relationship, the question 
before us is clear: what is human? What is it that makes a 
human being human? If Dick’s assessment of the android 
holds true, despite the brilliant idea behind it relating to 
the bordering progressive nuance that would sustain his 
attempt to mix the human and android in terms of the 
extraneousness of otherness, it seems obvious to me that 
a first level of response would lead us to distinguish the 
human as something to which we attribute the 
prerogative of the ‘natural’. Even if, in the final part of the 
passage quoted above, Dick himself has taken a decisive 
theoretical turn on this: owing to the extraneousness of 
the other already referred to, there is no difference 
between the ‘natural’ and the ‘synthetic’. And that’s not 
because the notion of naturalness, and with this that of 
artificiality, is in crisis. 
 
Again, we must start by clarifying our terminology: as 
for natural, after the long excursus on the doctrine of 
natural law we should at least have an idea of its 
problematic nature, namely the problematic nature of 
something which we can express as the ‘essential quality, 
innate disposition’, if not quite the ‘inborn character’ and 
‘state of being’. But the thing that is interesting to stress 
relates to the term ‘artificial’. In its commonly accepted 
meaning, it is ‘not natural’, i.e. something that involves a 
‘mechanical labour’ in order to create a form out of nature. 
 
From which it appears clear that its traditional 
acceptation is the result of contraposition, of 
differentiation through negation by a preconception: 
precisely that of nature, of the natural. 
 
It is therefore the conceptual crisis of the ‘natural’ 
which calls into question, calling for transformation, the 
‘artificial’. It is naturalness, the notion of man’s nature – as 
Ortega understood – which is in crisis, or rather the 
                                                             
26Dick PK (1976): 147. 
27Dick PK (1976): 148. 
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foundation of our classical humanism; which means that 
we are being called upon to reformulate all these 
categories, starting with the artificial, awarding it its own 
substantive autonomy. 
 
If it is true, as seems plausible, as the biophysicist 
Gregory Stock recently claimed, that ‘we are on the cusp 
of profound biological change, poised to transcend our 
current form and character on a journey to destinations of 
new imagination’28, such that the prospect of ‘the arrival 
of safe, reliable germline technology will signal the 
beginning of human self-design’29, or rather that presage 
that ‘the technological powers we have hitherto used so 
effectively to remake our world are now patent and 
precise enough for us to turn them on ourselves. 
Breakthroughs in the matrix-like arrays called DNA chips, 
which may soon read thirty thousand genes at a pop; in 
artificial chromosomes, which now divide as stably as 
their naturally occurring cousins; and in bioinformatics, 
the use of computer-driven methodologies to decipher 
our genomes – all are paving the way to human genetic 
engineering and the beginnings of human biological 
design’30. 
 
If it is true, in other words, that ‘never before have we 
had the power to manipulate human genetics to alter our 
biology in meaningful, predictable ways’ 31 , precisely 
because ‘biological enhancement will lead us into 
unexplored realms’32 to the point where we can predict 
that ‘progressive self-transformation could change our 
descendants into something sufficiently different from 
our present selves to not be human in the sense we use 
the term now’33, it all implies that we are changing the 
meaning (or meanings) that we have hitherto attributed 
to the concept of what it is to be human. 
 
The question, therefore, extracted from the science 
fiction of ‘what is human’, to avoid falling once again into 
the metaphysical trap, could be merely that which is less 
recognizable and which, through the medium of science 
itself (Ortega’s naturalism, for example), wonders about 
the essence of humanity, should be remodelled or even 
reformulated as follows: what is the sense of humanity? 
 
Our age is asking us and we cannot wait any longer. 
We need to reconsider the sense of what is human, and 
we need to do this from the enucleation of what is the 
                                                             
28 Stock G (2002): 1. 
29 Stock G(2002): 3. 
30 Stock G (2002): 13. 
31 Stock G (2002): 1. 
32 Stock G (2002): 2. 
33Stock G (2002): 4. 
method, what are the methods of humanity. There is no 
doubt, as has been emphasized, that we have entered ‘the 
confused stage of a man in completion, in which 
mutations, hybridizations, infections/invasions of the 
human kosmopolis [...] are turning into opportunity’34.  
 
That is to say, principally, of an acceleration in the 
direction of man’s mobility. A mobility which is defined 
first and foremost historically and which, with an ever 
more insistent rhythm thanks to the possibilities of 
modern science, is articulated through contamination, the 
mixed co-existence with extraneousness, with otherness, 
whether that otherness be organic or inorganic. 
 
Here, evidently, we find again the initial hurdle that we 
decided to overcome, that of the nature/culture antinomy. 
Hybridization, or any plan to deform and mutate is 
plausible only if it is capable of imagining a plastic and 
flexible correlation and co-partnership between the 
‘innate’ and the ‘learned’. If we consider our genetic 
heritage as a static form which is handed down from 
generation to generation, just round the corner there now 
lies not only and not so much the danger of a drift from 
the nature of innateness and substantiality, but a 
reintroduction of a more sophisticated form of natural 
law. 
 
Mobility on the other hand is fundamental to human 
beings: our genetic heritage also is in a constant process 
of deformation if only, as it has appeared hitherto, by 
‘natural’ evolution. But that does not really tell us about 
the plasticity of mankind or, in a nullifying way, of what 
we should understand by ‘innate’, of how that adjective 
can be misleading in its pretension of ‘unity’. 
 
Plasticity, that constant tension with change, with 
deformation as a device for osmotic dialogue with 
difference, as a true and proper co-existence beating time 
with difference (in this sense of otherness), is therefore 
something structural to and structuring of human nature. 
 
We can decide to force up the tempo of this plasticity 
by completely new methods. But not in a regime of 
contraposition between nature and culture – or rather 
under the sign of cooperative correlation – or under the 
banner of another mythical drift: that of the absoluteness 
of technology, and that is because technology is not a new 
method of self-revelation of being, but nothing more than 
an opportunity of mankind for mankind. 
 
                                                             
34Marchesini R (2002): 192. 
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Coexistence mixed with difference, a differing which is 
as organic as it is inorganic, finds shaky ground on and in 
this plasticity: and here, as a further step, plasticity no 
longer refers only to man’s biological ‘disposition’, but 
also and above all to his historically determined ability to 
build and make himself over time. 
 
Man is ‘making’ because he is before everything a self-
creation, a continual self-fabricating exercise which traces 
its own unique frontier in the concept of an existentive 
limit. 
 
The innovation that makes the epoch, therefore, and 
which colours our deforming capacity in a completely 
new way as unbroken bio-poietic processuality, we could 
connote as a bio-mechanical-poietic deforming activity. In 
other terms, innovation is above all about the modalities 
of ποίησις on the βίος and which, including for reasons of 
communicative synthesis, we could call ‘mechanical’. Not 
in the sense of being subject to some ideal form of 
mechanism, or simply because the bio-poiesis resolves 
itself in a mechanical ‘product’. But principally because 
ποίησις is realized through machines (and correlated 
technologies), designed and built by the βίος and, above 
all, for the βίος, with a view to deforming that βίος. Here 
the three words of the inscription, βίος, ποίησις and 
machine stand in a very close, not to say intimate and 
indissoluble correlation to one another. An osmosis which 
plays on a more articulate and innovative acceptation of 
man: man as open system. 
 
Open above all in the sense of a system that is 
constantly been projected towards new methods – 
theoretical or practical – of interpretation and 
experimentation as much by its own phylogenesis as its 
ontogenesis to the point that, as indicated, its 
distinctiveness resides in that inexorable deformative 
relationship, of contamination-mutation with the complex 
of external agencies and with itself. But open also in the 
sense of contra-reciprocal of pure system, that is closed 
around its own imaginary purity and perfection, its own 
self-referentiality as being, not just quantitatively, but 
also qualitatively finished once and for all. 
 
Obviously, here ‘open’ does not mean that, deep down, 
there is no equilibrative tension. It is only that it moves 
gradually, situationally, in terms of its deformative 
capacity and possibility. Man, therefore, is an ‘open 
system’ which proceeds in progressive shifts, attempts 
not so much to push his own frontiers a bit further as if 
there were a communication trench that had already been 
marked out and, consequently, a new finalistic order to be 
recomposed. But rather, and more strictly, further shifts 
and attempts at deformation and contamination-mutation 
caused by that inscribed pressure for modification against 
any ontological fissism. 
 
Reading man as an open system definitively collapses 
any substantialistic conception and any pretension of 
unchangeability in man himself. As Roberto Marchesini 
has explained, once again in exemplary fashion, man is ‘an 
explorer capable of finding continual conjunctive methods 
of approach’35 to the point that ‘humanity exudes the non-
human and builds itself through the abandonment of 
solitude and the pleasure of connection with the other, 
the different, capable of bringing new states of non-
equilibrium and yet of reinforcing man’s instinct to 
conjugate with the world’36, the consequence is soon 
stated. The subject can no longer identify itself ‘in a 
project of rediscovered virginity or in a process of purging 
itself of otherness but, on the contrary rediscovers its own 
personal and creative character through dealing with the 
system of otherness [...] that moves within him. In this 
sense every subjectivity is open, the fruit of a creative and 
non-determined process’37. 
 
And that is the subject, man is conatus fabbricandi 
beyond any chauvinistic presumption of 
anthropocentrism. In the end, there is no possibility of 
that because there subsists a universal law that 
consecrates anthropocentrism, that is a law connoted by 
its anteriority and ethical superiority. Man’s space, what 
makes man a conatus fabbricandi, lies in the effort-value 
relationship. 
 
If the value has value, provided it passes, each time, 
through the (historical) reaffirmation of its own validity 
and applicability, or rather the value and valuation which 
must unfailingly take account of its own historical 
effectiveness and ethical persuasiveness, and if the effort 
has value, as a capacity and (historical) possibility of 
opening new bio-(mechanical)-poietic horizons, the 
effort-value relationship is bi-directional. On the one hand 
value as historical enhancement tests and verifies the 
effort; on the other, the effort itself calls into question, and 
intrinsically induces, the validity and historical resistance 
of the value itself and hence of its own applicability. 
 
This fluid effort-value correlation certainly throws 
open the doors to the possibility of an unstable ethics 
which is consciously provisional and no longer supported 
by an anchor to metaphysics, to an ultra-physical ethical 
                                                             
35Marchesini R (2002): 69. 
36Marchesini R (2002): 70. 
37Marchesini R (2002): 70-71. 
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code. The only possible foundation lies in the certainty of 
the effort of action itself and of its constant analysis and 
re-elaboration in ever more complex and irresistibly 
fascinating scenarios, in an optic of circularity that does 
not know, cannot know, the solution to continuity. 
 
An effort which, ever the child of the dual burden of 
man’s temporal finiteness and of his precarious effort-
value relational situation (which could be described as a 
provisional situational ethic), makes room for the 
foundation of an ethics carried by an ethical surplus. 
Because to maintain itself, without ‘tables of the law’, in 
the situation and, at the same time, to have the capacity to 
orientate itself within it in reformulating distinctions of 
value that may actually be valid from time to time and, 
finally, to come to a decision about them, requires a 
surplus of strength and reflective application, as well as a 
prospective test. 
 
But, in the end, and here a small anthropocentric stain 
could easily seep into the tracery of the discourse, it may 
be possible to say that it is this which harbours the dignity 
of man which, in whatever way, together with his 
deforming capacity, marks out his distinctiveness, and in 
some respects, his uniqueness. 
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